Summary. In this paper we introduce the relative belief of singletons as a novel Bayesian approximation of a belief function. We discuss its nature in terms of degrees of belief under several different angles, and its applicability to different classes of belief functions.
Introduction: A new Bayesian approximation
The theory of evidence (ToE) [16] extends classical probability theory through the notion of belief function (b.f.), a mathematical entity which independently assigns probability values to sets of possibilities rather than single events. 
Previous work on Bayesian approximation
As probability measures or Bayesian belief functions are just a special class of b.f.s (for which m(A) = 0 when |A| > 1), the relation between beliefs and probabilities plays a major role in the theory of evidence [9, 14, 23, 11, 12, 13, 2] . Tessem [21] , for instance, incorporated only the highest-valued focal elements in his m klx approximation; a similar approach inspired the summarization technique formulated by Lowrance et al. [15] . In Smets' "Transferable Belief Model" [17] 
represent of the evidence not against a proposition A. Voorbraak [22] proposed indeed to adopt the so-called relative plausibility of singletons (rel.plaus.)pl b as the unique probability that, given a belief function b with plausibility pl b , assigns to each singleton x ∈ Θ its normalized plausibility (2) . He proved thatpl b is a perfect representative of b when combined with other probabilities p through Dempster's rule ⊕ [10] ,
The properties of the relative plausibility of singletons have been later discussed by Cobb and Shenoy [3] .
Relative belief of singletons
In this paper we introduce indeed a Bayesian approximation which is the dual of relative plausibility of singletons (2), as it is obtained by normalizing the belief (instead of plausibility) values of singletons:
We call it relative belief of singletonsb (rel.bel.). Clearlyb exists iff b assigns some mass to singletons:
As it has been recently proven [4] , both relative plausibility and belief of singletons commute with respect to Dempster's orthogonal sum, andb meets the dual of Voorbraak's representation theorem (2). In this paper we focus instead on the semantics of rel.bel. in a comparative study with that of rel.plaus., in order to understand its meaning in terms of degrees of belief, the way it attributes a mass to singletons, the conditions under which it exists, and to which classes of belief function it can be applied.
Outline of the paper
First (Section 2), we argue that rel.bel. gives a conservative estimate of the support b give to each singleton x ∈ Θ, in opposition to the optimistic estimate provided by the relative plausibility of singletons. Interestingly (Section 3) the relative beliefb can indeed be interpreted as the relative plausibility of singletons of the associated plausibility function. In order to prove that, we need to extend the evidential formalism to functions whose Moebius inverse is not necessarily positive or pseudo belief functions (Section 3.1). Those two Bayesian approximations form then a couple which, besides having dual properties with respect to Dempster's sum, have dual semantics in terms of mass assignment. In Section 4 we analyze the issue posed by the existence constraint (4), i.e. the fact that rel.bel. exists only when b assigns some mass to singletons. We will argue that situations in which the latter is not met are pathological, as all Bayesian approximations are forced to span a limited region of the probability simplex. Finally, we will prove that, as all those approximations converge for quasi-Bayesian b.f.s, rel.bel. can be seen as a low-cost proxy to pignistic transformation and relative plausibility, and discuss the applicability ofb to some important classes of b.f.s in order to shed more light on interpretation and application range of this Bayesian approximation.
A conservative estimate
A first insight on the meaning ofb comes from the original semantics of belief functions as constraints on the actual allocation of mass of an underlying unknown probability distribution. Accordingly, a focal element A with mass m b (A) indicates that this mass can "float" around in A and be distributed arbitrarily between the elements of A. In this framework, the relative plausibility of singletonspl b (2) can be interpreted as follows:
• for each singleton x ∈ Θ the most optimistic hypothesis in which the mass of all A ⊇ {x} focuses on x is considered, yielding {pl b (x), x ∈ Θ}; • this assumption, however, is contradictory as it is supposed to hold for all singletons (many of which belong to the same higher-size events); • nevertheless, the obtained values are normalized to yield a Bayesian belief function.
pl b is associated with the less conservative (but incoherent) scenario in which all the mass that can be assigned to a singleton is actually assigned to it. The relative belief of singletons (3) can then be naturally given the following interpretation in terms of mass assignments:
• for each singleton x ∈ Θ the most pessimistic hypothesis in which only the mass of {x} itself actually focuses on x is considered, yielding {b(
• this assumption is also contradictory, as the mass of all higher-size events is not assigned to any singletons; • the obtained values are again normalized to produce a Bayesian belief function.
Dually,b reflects the most conservative (but still not coherent) choice of assigning to x only the mass that the b.f. b (seen as a constraint) assures it belong to x. The underlying mechanism, though, is exactly the same as the one supporting the rel.plaus. function.
Dual interpretation as relative plausibility of a plausibility
A different aspect of rel.bel. emerges when considering the dual representation of the evidence carried by b expressed by the plausibility function pl b . We first need though to introduce the notion of "pseudo belief function".
Pseudo belief functions
A belief function is a function on 2 Θ whose Moebius inverse m b (the basic probability assignment) meets the positivity axiom:
where
Functions ς whose Moebius inverse meets the normalization constraint 
is called basic plausibility assignment (b.pl.a.), with µ b (∅) = 0.
Duality between relative belief and plausibility
A useful property of µ b is that
If we write the plausibility of singletons as 
by Theorem 1, which impliespl pl b =b. It is a bit paradoxical to point out that, as the basic plausibility assignment µ b carries the same information as the basic probability assignment m b , according to Equation (6) all the information carried by b is used to compute the relative belief of singletons, while its definition (3) seems to suggest that most of this information is discarded in the process.
On the existence constraint
The relative belief of singletons exists only for those belief function such that
Asb is the relative plausibility of ς = pl b (Section 3), and as relative plausibilities do not undergo any existence constraint (as x pl b (x) = 0), one could argue thatb should always exist. However, the symmetry is broken by the fact that the b.pl.a. µ b does not meet the non-negativity constraint (µ b ≥ 0), and as a consequence pl pl b (x) can actually be zero ∀x ∈ Θ.
Example: the binary case
In the binary case Θ = {x, y}, for instance, according to (4) the only b.f. which does not admit rel.bel. is the vacuous one 
Region spanned by a Bayesian approximation
One can argue that the existence of rel.bel. is subject to quite a strong condition (4). We can claim though that situations in which the constraint is not met are indeed rather pathological, in a very precise way. To show this, let us compute the region spanned by the most common Bayesian approximations: rel.plaus. (2) and pignistic function [19]
All Bayesian approximations can be seen as operators mapping belief functions to probabilities:
where B and P denote the set of all b.f.s and probability functions respectively. Now, it is well known [7] that the pignistic transformation (7)-right commutes with affine combination:
If we then denote by Cl the convex closure operator
(8) implies that BetP commutes with Cl:
.., k).
In the case ofpl b , even though the latter does not commute with affine combination (the relation being somehow more complex [5]) we can still prove that it commutes with convex closure (9) . Using this tools we can find the region of the probability simplex P spanned by the Bayesian transformation of a certain convex region Cl(b 1 , ..., b k ) of b.f.s. It suffices to compute in both cases the approximations of the vertices of the considered region.
Zero mass to singletons as a pathological situation
But the space of all belief functions B .
of all basis belief functions
i.e. the belief functions focusing on a single event A ⊆ Θ. Geometrically, they are the vertices of the polytope B of all belief functions (Figure 2-left) . The images of a basis b.f. b A under the transformations (7) arẽ
In normal conditions the whole probability simplex P can host such approx- 
The result is illustrated by Figure 2 -right in the ternary case. If (4) is not met, all Bayesian approximations of b can span only a limited region
of the probability simplex (delimited by dashed lines). The case in whichb does not exist is indeed pathological, as it excludes a great deal of belief and probability measures.
A low-cost proxy for other Bayesian approximations
A different angle on the utility ofb comes from a discussion of what classes of b.f.s are "suitable" to be approximated by means of (3). As it only makes use of the masses of singletons, working withb requires storing n values to represent a belief function. As a consequence, the computational cost of combining new evidence through Dempster's rule or disjunctive combination [18] is reduced to O(n) as only the mass of singletons has to be calculated. When the actual values ofb(x) are close to those provided by, for instance, pignistic function or rel.plaus. is then more convenient to resort to the relative belief transformation.
Convergence under quasi-Bayesianity
A formal support to this argument is provided by the following result. Let us call quasi-Bayesian b.f.s the belief functions b for which the mass assigned to singletons is very close to one:
Theorem 2. For quasi-Bayesian b.f.s all Bayesian approximations converge:
. Theorem 2 highlights then the convenience of computing rel.bel. instead of other Bayesian approximations for quasi-Bayesian b.f.s defined on a large frame of discernment.
Convergence in the ternary case
Let us consider for instance the ternary case Θ = {x, y, z} in which slower for discounted belief functions, i.e. b.f.s which assign all the mass of non-singletons to the whole frame Θ (case b), a rather counterintuitive result. 
Conclusions
In this paper we discussed interpretations and applicability of the relative belief of singletons as a novel Bayesian approximation of a belief function. It has recently been proven that relative belief and plausibility of singletons form a distinct family of Bayesian approximations related to Dempster's rule, as they both commute with ⊕, and meet dual representation and idempotence properties [4] . Here we focused in particular on the semantics of rel.bel. On one side we stressed the analogy between the mechanisms generating relative belief and plausibility, pointing out that they correspond to antithetical estimates of the evidence supporting each singleton. We proved thatb is in fact equivalent to the relative plausibility of a plausibility (seen as a pseudo belief function), but that this symmetry is broken by the existence constraint acting onb. We argued though that situations in which the latter is not met are pathological, as all Bayesian approximations are forced to span a limited region of the probability simplex. Finally, we proved that, as all those approximations converge for quasi-Bayesian b.f.s, rel.bel. can be seen as a low-cost proxy to pignistic transformation and relative plausibility. The analysis of this convergence for different classes of b.f.s has provided us with some insight on the relation between the probabilities associated with a belief function. 
